Recently there has been a lot of discussion about PPSC v. WTA on the forum. And while it is a great discussion to have, unfortunately, I feel as though the conversation has skirted away from (and somewhat refuses to acknowledge) a situation that I feel is a major problem. Naturally I am referring to the title of this post: Playing for the Win.

WTA or PPSC aside, the only recognized objective in Diplomacy is to be the first to 18 supply centers. In fact, the ONLY outcome beside a solo recognized in the rules is a draw amongst all survivors, and even that is simply recognized as a secondary outcome which comes about when a solo attempt is stopped. However, many players on this site seem to find it OK to simply ignore the recognized objective and play for a different goal. This typically manifests itself with players who choose to go for a draw from the beginning, or near-beginning of the game, something that is most definitely NOT what Diplomacy was intended for.

Now, you might be saying, “Drano, where are you getting this whole idea of what Diplomacy was intended for? “. That is a wonderful question, and to answer it, we must go to the creator of Diplomacy himself, Allan Calhamer. In his article, “Objectives other than Winning”, Calhamer states,

“The assumption behind the 18 centre victory criterion is that, given 18 units to a disunited combination of only 16 units, the leader can in general eventually conquer the whole board. Thus, no country survives except his own. Critics have claimed that there are positions in which certain countries could survive by stalemate, or by regaining a combination of 17 or more units; consequently, the notion that a country gaining 18 units could sweep the board is not invariably correct. It is my opinion that this point is of negligible importance, because almost all of the games will not come out that way, and because the victory criterion must have some hard and fast definition, and because it takes a long time to acquire 18 units as it is.”

“Following the assumption that a power holding 18 units can sweep the board, it then appears that no power has survived the game unless he has achieved either a win or a draw. The reward for a draw, then, is the reward for survival in a dangerous world.”

These two quotes clearly destroy any attempt to claim survival as a legitimate goal in a game. Survival is nothing. Calhamer clearly states that he intended survival to be equivalent to a defeat, albeit, one that is assumed to happen after the game has technically ended. Therefore, when we teach Diplomacy to new players, we should NOT be teaching them with PPSC, as PPSC has a different end game where survival MIGHT be an optimal objective for some players in certain positions. To teach it this way is to teach it against the creator’s intent. Indeed, this is a strong argument for changing the default setting away from PPSC as the play style of PPSC can clearly conflict with the intended end-game play style that Calhamer wanted. Indeed, there are more quotes further down in the article that further take apart any attempt to defend a strong second or survival while letting someone else solo as a worthy objective.

Now, what about draws? Let’s see what Calhamer has to say about them.

“Giving equal credit to all those sharing in the draw also encourages the smallest power to fight for the draw, instead of giving up without a fight. If they give up without a fight, the larger powers may not get a draw either, since the leader may benefit from their collapse and win.
One of the bad features about scoring the draw equally for all participants is that some three or four players in a game might lose sight of the primary objective altogether, and play only to knock out the other players, after which they would probably have a draw, since none of them had manoeuvred to weaken the others. In this way, players might achieve above average results, at least until other players got onto them. However, they would not be likely to achieve high results, such as the highest places in a tournament, or for that matter, even a single victory. Thus, if the value of the draw were increased, there might be incentive to play for the draw from the start, which is anti-competitive; whereas if the value of the draw were reduced, there might be less incentive to unite to stop the leader, which would also be an anti-competitive result.”

The key line there is the one I bolded and underlined. Calhamer clearly states that anyone who plays only to knock out other players and then have a pre-determined draw has lost sight of the primary objective. His wording clearly implies that people doing this are in the wrong and as such, this should not be the way to play Diplomacy.

And so, where does that leave us? If we are not to play for a survive, and we aren’t supposed to play for a pre-determined draw, what ARE we supposed to do? Well clearly, Calhamer intended for each and every one of us to play for the solo. He intended for us to maneuver throughout the game to weaken our enemies (and yes, EVERYONE in the game is your enemy technically, even if you are ‘allied’ during the game) and to strengthen our position so that we would have a shot at going for the solo. It is the solo that is the primary objective, and one that people lose sight of too easily. He did not intend for us to sit back and just accept a draw because we were unwilling to make that risky play and go for the solo. He did not intend for us to say, “Well, I never like attacking allies, but I can’t solo if I don’t, so I’ll just draw”. He did not intend for us to draw because someone “played well” or any other “carebear” reasoning as some people call it. No, Calhamer intended for us to be risky and bold and to go for that ever-elusive solo victory. I’ll leave you with one last quote of Calhamer’s that I think should get the point across, and one that we really should take to heart with our playing here on vDip.

“This final attempt to contain the leader is sometimes one of the most dramatic and exciting parts of the game. Co-operation must be created among players who have been fighting one another, and who have set their hearts on other objectives; they must admit that goal they have pursued all game long, which are now within their grasp, have just lost their value, and may even be destructive. Frequently, they are out of position for the new encounter, and are better positioned to fight each other. They must form a line together, exposing their territories to each other. This is not the co-operation of merely being assigned to the same team. This co-operation is hard won over difficulties. This is Verdun.

Sometimes allies in this position take pot-shots at one another, trying to gain as much as they can without collapsing the alliance; sometimes they lack aggressiveness because they suspect each other. Almost always they come around to the grand alliance too late. History has seen aplenty of these things.

The opportunities for this final high battle, this Armageddon, this human drama, are, of course, dribbled away if a "strong second" player is within reach of second. He is the knocked-out bottom of the jug that might have contained the leader.”